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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Section 58-31OA, Idaho Code, exempts from the conflict auction requirements in Idaho

Code § 58-310 "single family, recreational cottage sites and homesites" ("cottage sites") and
directs the State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board" or "Board") "to reject any and all
pending and future conflict auction applications filed under sections 58-307 and 58-310" for the
cottage sites.

Idaho Code § 58-310A(2) (App. A). In lieu of the conflict auction process, the

statute instructs the Land Board to "insure that each leased lot generates market rent throughout
the duration of the lease." ld. § 58-31 OA(3).
The Attorney General brought suit in district court seeking a declaration that § 58-31OA
conflicts with the requirement in Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution (App. B) that the
Legislature ensure that "the general grants of lands made by congress ... shall be held in trust,
subject to disposal at public auction" and is therefore unconstitutional in all possible
applications. The District Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Valley County, rejected the
Attorney General's claim, concluding that the term "disposal" in Article IX, Section 8 "does not
encompass partial conveyances of real property such as leases"-i. e., "state land is only disposed
of when it is no longer being preserved and held in trust." R. Addendum, p. 35, LL. 17-18,25 &
p. 36, L. 1 (App. C).

1

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A.

Overview

This appeal arises from a judgment in a consolidated case involving two proceedings
initiated in different counties of the Fourth Judicial District. The first action, Babcock v. Idaho

State Board of Land Commissioners, No. CV-2010-436-C (4th Jud. Dist., Valley County)
("Babcock"), was filed in Valley County District Court on October 22,2010, by a large group of
cottage site lessees adjacent to or near Payette Lake (collectively, "Payette Lake Lessees"). The
second action, Wasden v. State Board of Land Commissioners, No. CV-OC-20l0-23751 (Fourth
Jud. Dist., Ada County) ("Wasden"), was commenced on December 2, 2010, in Ada County
District Court by the Attorney General. The Babcock litigation against the Land Board and the
Idaho Department of Lands Director ("Director"), as ultimately narrowed, related to the proper
interpretation and application of the certain provisions in the 2001-2010 cottage site lease. l
Neither the Lessees in their complaint nor the Board by way of defense raised the
constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31OA as an issue. The Wasden litigation, as ultimately
narrowed, presented only the question of § 58-31OA's facial constitutionality. The Babcock
district court (McLaughlin, J., presiding) consolidated Wasden into the Valley County
proceeding pursuant to LR.C.P. 42(a) on March 8,2011. R Vol. III, p. 556.
The district court resolved both proceedings under LR.C.P. 56 in a memorandum decision
and order entered on June 6, 2011. R Addendum, p. 22. Separate motions and briefs were

2

submitted during the summary judgment process, but the underlying motions were argued orally
at the same hearing. The district court denied the Attorney General's motion directed to the
facial constitutionality of § 58-310A in Wasden and granted the Land Board's motion for
summary judgment in Babcock. A single final judgment in the consolidated case consistent with
the summary judgment order entered on August 10,2011 (R Addendum, p. 42), from which the
Attorney General appealed as to the Wasden-related component (R Vol, IV, p. 718) and the
Payette Lake Lessees appealed as to the Babcock-related component (id., p. 733).

A more

detailed summary of the Wasden and Babcock litigation follows.
B.

Wasden

The Attorney General's complaint for declaratory and injunctive named the Land Board
and the Director in his official capacity as the sole defendants. R Vol. I, p. 30. It alleged three
claims for relief: (1) Idaho Code § 58-31OA violates Article IX, Section 8 by authorizing the
lease of the cottage sites subject to the statute without compliance with the public auction
requirement in the constitutional provision; (2) the Board violated its duty to "secure the
maximum long term financial return" to endowment land beneficiaries by establishing a rental
rate pursuant to the authority nominally vested in it under § 58-310A substantially below that
which would generate such return; and (3) the Board violated § 58-31OA's direction to set an
appropriate "market rent" by, inter alia, "its utilization of phase-in periods for rental increases to
mitigate perceived hardships on lessees." R Vol. I, pp. 46-47. The subject matter of the second

When the underlying actions were filed, the Director was George Bacon who
subsequently retired. The current Director is Tom Schultz. He should be substituted for Mr.
1

3

claim had been before this Court in Wasden ex reI. State v. Idaho State Board of Land

Commissioners, 150 Idaho 547,249 P.3d 346 (2010) ("Wasden ex rei. State"), in the context ofa
petition for writ of prohibition. The second and third claims were dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to LR.C.P. 41(a)(1)(ii) on December 23,2011 (R Vol. II, p. 385), after the Land Board
adopted a flat 4 percent rental rate for ten-year recreational cottage site leases anticipated to be
issued for the 2012-2021 period.
The controversy over the validity of § 58-31 OA is not new but crystallized in March 2010
when the Land Board, in a three-to-two vote, instructed the Director to prepare a draft ten-year
cottage-site lease template for Board review and approval that would take effect on
January 1,2011, when the then-current ten-year leases expired. R Vol. I, pp. 38-41,

~~

20-22.

Because that process had not been completed at the time the Wasden litigation began, the
Attorney General filed with the complaint a motion that requested entry of a preliminary
injunction under LRC.P. 65(e) enjoining the Director from presenting to the Board for its
consideration and execution 2011-2020 leases for the cottage sites or executing such leases if
presented. R. Vol. I, p. 49. Prior to the December 15, 2010 hearing on the motion, the Payette
Lake Lessees requested intervention as defendants. Id, p 115. Their motion was granted orally
at the preliminary injunction hearing (Dec. 15,2010 Tr. 29, LL 9-12) and confirmed by written
order on December 16, 2010 (R. Vol. I, p. 180).2

Bacon as a respondent. See LA.R. 48 and LR.C.P. 25(d).
2 Intervention in Wasden as a defendant also was sought on February 22, 2011, by and granted
on March 22, 2011, to the Priest Lake State Lessees Association ("Priest Lake Association" or
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The Ada County district court (Bail, J., presiding) granted the Attorney General's
preliminary injunction motion in an order entered on December 17, 2010. R. Vol. II, p. 224.
The injunction prohibited the Director from "issuing the Template Lease for the single family,
recreational cottage and homesites subject to Idaho Code § 58-310A" until further order of the
Court. !d., p. 226. 3 On the same date, the Payette Lake Lessees moved to consolidate Wasden
into the earlier-filed Babcock. The Wasden parties then stipulated under LR.C.P. 41(a)(l)(ii) to
the dismissal without prejudice of the second and third claims for relief on December 23,2010,
leaving only the Attorney General's facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 58-310A at
issue (R Vol. II, p. 385)-a claim as to which the Attorney General had moved for summary
judgment on the previous day (id., p. 375).
The Attorney General, as well as the Land Board and the Director, unsuccessfully

"Association"). R Vol. III, p. 532. The Association was formed "for the purpose of representing
holders of cottage site leases at Priest Lake." Id., p. 536, ~ 1.
3 The "Reasons for Issuance" component included several interlineations made by the district
court that concerned the order's effect on then-existing leases. R Vol. II, p. 225. Those
interlineations provided the basis for the Payette Lake Lessees filing a motion for sanctions
under I.R.C.P. 75 on January 27, 2011, based on the contention that the Land Board was
precluded by the injunction from altering 2010 rental rates for lease year 2011. The motion was
heard subsequent to the consolidation of the Ada County case with the Payette Lake Lessees'
action against the Land Board related to the latter's determination to issue new ten-year leases
with an increased rental rate formula. The Valley County district court deemed the Ada County
district court's interlineations to be "conflicting" but concluded "that Judge Bail intended that the
status quo, whether it was the rates charged for these cottage sites or the amount of rent charged
for these cottage sites would remain at 2010 levels until further ruling on the multiplicity of
issues that have been brought before the Court." R Vol. IV, p. 681, LL. 10-14. The court
therefore denied the motion for sanctions but "order[ed] that the lease payments remain as set for
2010 and any payments by lessees in excess of that will be either refunded or be credited against
any future installment payments on the leasehold estates." Id., p. 682, LL. 9-11.
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opposed consolidation. R Vol. III, pp. 517, 549. Subsequent to the change of venue on March
29, 2011 (id, p. 570), briefing on the Attorney General's motion for summary judgment
concluded, and the motion was argued on May 3,2011. 4 The district court denied the motion on
June 6, 2011, concluding in part "that public auctions are not required for leases of public lands
because the term 'disposal' contained in Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution does not

4 The Attorney General's motion was opposed by the Payette Lake Lessees and the Association.
R Vol. III, pp. 572; R Vol. IV, p. 596. The Land Board did not participate in the summary
judgment motion briefing and previously had stated in a memorandum opposing entry of a
preliminary injunction that it took no position with respect to the constitutionality of § 58-310A.
R Vol. I, p. 156 ("The Land Board takes no position with regard to the constitutionality ofIdaho
Code Section 58-31 OA. The Land Board is required to comply with that statute unless and until
it is repealed by the legislature or is determined to be unconstitutional by the Court"); accord
Dec. 15,2010 Tr. 18:14-22. However, the Board requested realignment in Wasden as a plaintiff
on May 25, 201 I-i.e., after the Attorney General's summary judgment motion had been briefed
and argued before the district court. R Addendum, p. 5. The Board discussed the basis for its
change of position in the realignment motion's supporting memorandum:
The Land Board ... has concluded that the mandate imposed under Article IX,
Section 8 with respect to the public auction of endowment land leases is plain and that §
58-31OA should be invalidated. The Board, in this regard, finds the analysis in
Attorney General Opinion No. 09-01 and the Attorney General's memorandums
supporting his motion for summary judgment persuasive. Indeed, two members of the
Supreme Court recently observed that § 58-310A "is clearly unconstitutional-in
eliminating the conflict auction procedure and instead requiring 'market rent'-the
legislature encroached upon the discretion constitutionally granted to the Land Board."
Wasden ex reI. State v. Idaho State Bd of Land Comm'rs, 249 P.3d 346, 357 n.lO
(Idaho 2010) (Burdick, J., dissenting). Those Justices correctly added that "until
declared unconstitutional, I.C. § 58-310A must still be followed by the Land Board[,]"
but that obligation does not foreclose the Board from seeking such a declaration.
Having failed to in its efforts to have the Legislature bring this aspect of endowment
lands leasing back within the constraints of Article IX, Section 8 through repeal of § 58310A as proposed in Senate Bill No. 1145, 61st Legis., 1st Sess. (2011), § 2, the Board
believes that the time has arrived for a definitive judicial determination. Its realignment
as a party plaintiff is accordingly appropriate.
fd, pp. 8-9. The district court issued its summary judgment ruling shortly after completion of
the briefing on the realignment motion, and the motion was not pursued further.
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include leases." R Addendum, p. 36, LL. 2-4. The court also resolved in the same memorandum
decision cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the Payette Lake Lessees and the Land
Board in Babcock, concluding that the Lessees' action was barred because they failed "to
exhaust their administrative remedies before pursuing their breach of contract claims."
R Addendum, p. 32, LL. 9-10. The Attorney General then requested entry of final judgment in
the consolidated case (id., p. 684), and the district court granted the request in a memorandum
decision on July 27, 2011 (id., p. 687).

Final judgment was entered on August 10, 2011.

R Addendum, p. 42. The Attorney General filed a notice of appeal with respect to that portion of
the judgment related to Wasden on the same date. R Vol. IV, p. 718.
C.

Babcock

The Payette Lake Lessees' original complaint contained six "counts"-the first two of
which were based in contract against the Land Board and the Director. R Vol. I, pp. 9 - 13.
They filed an amended complaint on November 10, 2011, but the contract counts remained
unaffected. Id., pp. 24-25. The Lessees filed a motion for partial summary judgment directed to
the contract counts on December 9,2010 (id., p. 82), while the Board cross-moved for summary
judgment as to those claims on January 13,2011 (R Vol. II, p. 388).
The core dispute between the parties as to the merits turned on whether the 2001-2010
cottage site leases provided the Lessees a right to renew and thereby foreclosed the Board from
imposing a different set of lease terms for the 2011-2020 period as it had determined to do at its
March 16, 2010 meeting. Compare R Vol. I, p. 94 (Lessees' contention that "the Land Board's
attempt to unilaterally impose a new lease with a new rent formula on existing lessees constitutes

7

a breach of the lease's renewal provisions"), with id., R Vol. III, p. 512 (Board's contention that
"[t]he 2001 Leases simply do not grant the Payette Lessees a right to renew the lease, much less
on the same terms as the 2001 Lease"). The Lessees argued alternatively that, were the Court to
reject their right-of-renewal claim, they were entitled under their 2001-2010 leases to the
reasonable value of the improvements which they had made to the leased parcels.
R Vol. I, 99-100.

The Board raised the non-merits defense that the Lessees' contract claims

challenged an "agency action and that judicial review under the Idaho Administrative Procedure
Act, Idaho Code §§ 67-5201 to -5292, was the sole method for challenging the alleged contract
non-compliance.

R Vol. I, pp. 405-09.

During the course of the summary judgment

proceedings, the parties stipulated to the dismissal without prejudice of the remaining counts in
the amended complaint. Id., pp. 391,455.
The district court agreed with the Land Board that the contract claims were subject to the
AP A and found that the Lessees had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
R Addendum, p. 31 L. 26

p. 32, L. 6 ("Here, the Plaintiffs have pled a cause of action that

could have a potential remedy under either the AP A or general contract principles. However,
'important policy considerations underlie the requirement for exhausting administrative
remedies, such as providing the opportunity for mitigating or curing errors without judicial
intervention, deferring to the administrative processes established by the Legislature and the
administrative body, and the sense of comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the administrative
body."'). It therefore granted summary judgment to the Board in its June 6, 2011 decision and
entered final judgment with respect to the contract counts on August 10, 2011. R Addendum,

8

p.42. The Lessees filed a notice of cross-appeal on September 20,2011. R Vol. IV, p. 733.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Wasden: Litigation Background

The Idaho Constitution, Art. IX, § 8, required the Legislature, "at the earliest practicable
period, [to] provide by law that the general grants of land made by congress to the state shall be
judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction
for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said grants ofland were made." Article
IX, Section 8, although variously modified since 1890, remains unchanged as to its public
auction requirement and sets the controlling limits on legislative authority with regard to
endowment land "disposal."s

S

Article IX, Section 8 read as originally adopted in its entirety:
It shall be the duty of the State Board of Land Commissioners to provide for the
location, protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be,
granted to the state by the general government, under such regulations as may be
prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the maximum possible amount
therefor: Provided, that no school lands shall be sold for less than ten (10) dollars per
acre. No law shall ever be passed by the Legislature granting any privileges to persons
who may have settled upon any such public lands, subsequent to the survey thereof by
the general government, by which the amount to be derived by the sale, or other
disposition of such lands, shall be diminished, directly or indirectly. The Legislature
shall, at the earliest practicable period, provide by law that the general grants of land
made by Congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and
held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the
respective objects for which said grants of land were made, and the Legislature shall
provide for the sale of said lands from time to time and for the sale of timber on all state
lands and for the faithful application of the proceeds thereof in accordance with the
terms of said grants: Provided, that not to exceed twenty-five sections of school lands
shall be sold in anyone year, and to be sold in subdivisions of not to exceed one
hundred and sixty (160) acres to anyone individual, company or corporation.

9

One category of state endowment lands is land proximate to Payette and Priest Lakes.
This land, in turn, has been administered over time as myriad parcels-the "cottage sites"-for
leasing purposes. See R Clerk's Ex. 2 (Aff. of Steven W. Strack, Ex. 3 at 1).6 Currently,
167 cottage site leases are associated with Payette Lake and 355 leases with Priest Lake. !d.
Section 58-310, Idaho Code, provides a public auction procedure "[w]hen two (2) or more
persons apply to lease the same land," but in 1990 the Legislature exempted cottage sites from
that procedure. 1990 Idaho Session Laws chapter 187, codified at Idaho Code § 58-31OA. The
1990 legislation remains unchanged and, in practical effect, substitutes the Land Board's
determination as to the appropriate "market rent" for the cottage sites for the public auction
process. See Idaho Code § 58-31OA(3) ("[i]n the absence of the conflict application and auction

See Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, 574, 107 P. 493, 494-95 (1910) (quoting provision).
Article IX, Section 8 has been amended subsequently, but the only modifications to its language
quoted in the text in the current provision were (1) the substitution of the words "the appraised
price" for "ten (10) dollars per acre" in the first sentence; (2) revising the second proviso to read
"provided, that not to exceed one hundred sections of state lands shall be sold in anyone year,
and to be sold in subdivisions of not to exceed three hundred and twenty acres of land to anyone
individual, company or corporation[;]" and (3) substituting "long term financial return to the
institution to which granted or to the state if not specifically granted" for "amount possible
therefor. "
6 Appended to the Affidavit of Steven W. Strack was a report entitled Analysis of Procedures for
Residential Real Estate (Cottage Site) Leases on Idaho Endowment Lands. This analysis was
prepared at Secretary of State Ysursa's request by Philip S. Cook and Jay O'Laughlin on behalf
of the Policy Analysis Group, College of Natural Resources, University of Idaho, for use by the
Land Board in its cottage site-related deliberations. R Clerk's Ex. 2 (Aff. of Steven W. Strack,
Ex. 3). The report contains background facts related to the history and nature of cottage site
leasing on or near Payette and Priest Lakes. This Court's opinion in Wasden ex reI. State also
summarizes the history and nature of the cottage site leasing program. 150 Idaho at 549-51,
249 P.3d 348-50.
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procedure in the single family, recreational cottage site and homesite lease, and lease renewal
process, the board shall insure that each leased lot generates market rent throughout the duration
of the lease").

The Legislature's findings left no doubt about its intent in this regard.

Id § 58-3IOA(1 )(g) and (h) (finding "[t]hat section 8, article IX, of the constitution of the state
of Idaho provides that the board manage state endowment lands in such manner as will secure
the maximum long-term financial return to the institution to which granted or to the state if not
specifically granted" and "that maximum long-term financial returns to the institutions to which
granted are best obtained through stable leases at market rent").
At the time of Wasden's filing, the cottage sites were subject to ten-year leases expiring
on December 31,2010. R Clerk's Ex. 5 (Aff. of Bob Brammer, Ex. A).

In anticipation of the

leases' expiration, the Board adopted at its March 2010 meeting a new lease rate formula for
inclusion in the successor lease for the 2011-2020 period. See Mar. 16, 2010 Land Board
Minutes at 5, available at http://www.idl.idaho.gov/LandBoardJ20IOMinutesPDF/marI610finmin.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).7

While the stated lease rate was 4 percent, the

actual rental rate under the new lease rate formula was determined by the Director to be between
1.5 and 2.4 percent. Wasden ex rei. State, 150 Idaho at 551,249 P.3d at 350. In response to the
Land Board's action, the Attorney General sought issuance of a writ of prohibition from this
Court on the basis that the Board was "acting in excess of its jurisdiction under the Idaho
Constitution and statutory law in attempting to lease state endowment lands for less than market
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rent." !d. The Court dismissed the petition on December 1, 2010, after concluding that the
availability of declaratory and injunctive relief provided "a 'plain, speedy, and adequate'
alternative" remedy. 150 Idaho at 553, 249 P.3d at 352; see also id at 554, 249 P.3d at 353. The
Attorney General's petition did not challenge the underlying validity of the statute under which
the Board acted-§ 58-31 OA-a fact that the dissenting opinion noted:
Although not argued by any party here, I.e. § 58-310A is clearly unconstitutional asin eliminating the conflict auction procedure and instead requiring "market rent"-the
legislature encroached upon the discretion constitutionally granted to the Land Board.
Incidentally, it seems axiomatic that where the Land Board failed to obtain market rent,
it was not obtaining the maximum long-term financial returns, as is mandated by the
Idaho Constitution. However, until declared unconstitutional, I.C. § 58-310A must still
be followed by the Land Board.
150 Idaho at 558, 249 P.3d at 357 n.10 (Burdick, J., dissenting). The Attorney General filed

Wasden on the day after this Court's dismissal ofthe petition for writ of prohibition.
B.

Wasden: Facial Character Of Constitutional Challenge And District Court's
Summary Judgment Ruling

Unlike the prohibition proceeding, the Attorney General placed the constitutionality of
§ 58-31OA, insofar as it exempted cottage site leases from the public auction requirement, at
issue. This constitutional challenge became the sole subject of the Wasden litigation upon the
dismissal on December 23, 2010, under I.R.C.P. 41(a)(l)(ii) of the two other claims in his
district court complaint. The Attorney General brought the action on behalf of the cottage-site
lease income beneficiaries in the discharge of his statutory responsibility to supervise "nonprofit

Section 58-307, Idaho Code, was amended in 2008 to allow certain lands, including residential
cottage sites, to be leased for periods up to 35 years. 2008 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 103 (codified at
Idaho Code § 58-307(3». The Land Board nevertheless opted to maintain the ten-year period.
7
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corporations, corporations, charitable or benevolent societies, persons or person holding property
subject to any public or charitable trust" and enforce "whenever necessary any noncompliance or
departure from the general purpose of such trust" (Idaho Code § 67-1401(5)) and to invalidate an
impermissible statutory infringement on his duty as a Land Board member to act consistently
with Article IX, Section 8. R Vol. I, p. 32 at 'if 3; see also Wasden ex reI. State, 150 Idaho at 552,
249 P.3d at 351 n.8; id at 558,249 P.3d at 357 n.lO.
The challenge to § 58-310A below was facial in nature; i. e., because the public auction
requirement in Article IX, Section 8 applies to the Land Board's rental of the cottage sites, the
Legislature's direction to the Land Board to substitute a "market rent" determination for the
auction process is unconstitutional and was not severable from the remainder of the statute. The
district court recognized the character of the Attorney General's claim.

R Addendum, p. 33,

LL. 19-20 ("the Attorney General has challenged the constitutionality of I.C. § 58-310A on its
face"). It also recognized that the scope of the term "disposal" in the third sentence of Article
IX, Section 8 controlled the claim's resolution. Id, p. 35, LL. 10-14 ("[i]fthe term 'disposal'
does not include leases, I.C. § 58-310A is constitutional unless the Attorney General can
establish no set of circumstances exists under which the conflict auction exemption contained in
I.C. § 58-310A could possibly 'secure the maximum long term financial return' on the cottage
sites"). The court then stated its construction of the term:
The Court's understanding of the term "disposal" in that context is that state land is
only disposed of when it is no longer being preserved and held in trust. "A lease is a
particular kind of contract wherein (generally) a leasehold interest in realty is given in
return for a promise to pay rent periodically." Krasselt v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124, 125,
578 P.2d 240, 241 (1978). A lessee has both contract rights and a limited ownership
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interest in the real property. Id Although the cottage sites at issue in this case have
been leased, those lands are still being preserved and held in trust which means that they
have not been disposed of. Furthermore, the plain meaning of the term "disposal" does
not encompass partial conveyances of real property such as leases. Therefore, the Court
will find that public auctions are not required for leases of public lands because the term
"disposal" contained in Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution does not include
leases.

Id, p. 35, L. 15

p. 36, L. 4. In reaching this construction, the court did not analyze the overall

structure of Article IX, Section 8, the particular structure of the provision's third sentence, or
provision's use of the terms "sale," "rent," or "sold," and "disposition."
The district court's analysis instead focused on the Attorney General's reliance on the
decisions in a quartet of actions brought by the Idaho Watersheds Project ("IWP") against the
Land Board: IWP v. State Board, 128 Idaho 761, 918 P.2d 1206 (1996) ("IWP I"); IWP v. State
Board, 133 Idaho 55, 982 P.2d 358 (1999) ("IWP II"); IWP v. State Board, 133 Idaho 64,

982 P.2d 367 (1999) ("IWP III"); IWP v. State Board, 133 Idaho 68, 982 P.2d 371 (1999) ("IWP
IV"). The court reasoned that neither IWP I nor the earlier decision in East Side Blaine County
Live Stock Association v. State Board, 34 Idaho 807, 198 P. 760 (1921), established that the

public auction requirement applied to leasing activity but, instead, were statutorily grounded.
R Addendum, p. 37, LL. 4-8 ("This limited reference to the Idaho Constitution [in IWP 1's

concluding sentence] does not appear to have been necessary to the Court's ultimate
determination in that case. The Court's holding was based primarily on I.C. § 58-310B and at no
point in the decision did the Court hold that any lease of state lands must be subject to public
auction in order to secure the maximum long term financial return."); id, LL. 21-23 ("[t]he
Court's analysis in East Side repeatedly refers to the statutory basis for the auction requirement,
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making the constitutional references unnecessary to the holding in that case"). The court deemed
IWP II-which invalidated a constitutional amendment that replaced "disposal" with "sale"-as

only "demonstrat[ing] that the term 'disposal' is ambiguous." Id., p. 39, LL. 6-7. IWP III, in the
district court's view, lacked relevance because "[t]he key to the [Court's] holding ... was that
'[b]y attempting to promote funding for the schools and the state through the leasing of the
school endowment lands, I.e. § 58-310B violates the requirements of Article IX, § 8.'"
Id., p. 38, LL. 18-21. The court concluded that "it is clear that the Idaho Supreme Court has

never determined whether it is possible for leases of public lands to secure maximum long term
financial return for the endowment lands' beneficiaries without subjecting the leases to a public
auction requirement." Id., p. 39, LL. 15-18. 8

The district court also held that "nothing in I.C. § 58-310A ... prevents the Land Board from
utilizing current fair market value and determining a rate of return that secures maximum long
term financial return for the designated beneficiaries." R Addendum, p. 39, LL. 18-20. The
Attorney General has never argued the contrary although, as reflected in the prohibition
proceeding in Wasden ex reI. State, he disputes that the Board has used its rent-setting authority
under the statute to generate such a return. It bears mention, however, that IWP III is instructive
concerning another constitutionally suspect feature of Idaho Code § 58-31OA: The legislative
findings reflecting that the 1990 Act resulted in part from the fact that, "in the case of single
family, recreational cottage site and homesite leases, the conflict application and auction
procedure have [sic] caused considerable consternation and dismay to the existing lessee at the
prospect of losing a long-time lease." Id. § 58-31OA(1)(e). This Court invalidated Idaho Code
§ 58-31 OB because it impermissibly directed the Board to consider interests other than the
endowment land beneficiaries in making leasing determinations; so, too, § 58-31OA suggests a
legislative desire to ameliorate existing lessees' "consternation and dismay" by removing the
market force mechanism implicit in a public auction and substituting the Land Board's market
rent assessment. Article IX, Section 8 requires the Legislature, no less than the Board, to act
with undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries in making "maximum long term financial return"
assessments, but the 1990 Act plainly was motivated by a desire to confer a benefit-the
elimination of lease conflictors--on existing lessees. This possible basis for § 58-310A's
invalidation was not raised below because, even had the Legislature exercised undivided loyalty
8
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether Idaho Code § 58-31OA conflicts with the requirement in Article IX, Section 8 of
the Idaho Constitution that school trust lands be subject to disposal at public auction and
therefore is unconstitutional in its entirety.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has summarized the standards governing disposition of summary judgment

motions filed under LR.C.P. 56 in many decisions. They were identified recently in Soignier v.
Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 256 P.3d 730 (2011):
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
LR.C.P. 56(c). The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issues of
material fact exist. ... Disputed facts and reasonable inferences are construed in favor
ofthe nonmoving party.
151 Idaho at 324, 256 P.3d at 732 (citation omitted). The Court applies the same standards as
the district court on review and examines the propriety of summary judgment de novo. Karr v.
Bermeosolo, 142 Idaho 444, 448, 129 P.3d 88, 92 (2010). A facial challenge to a statute's
constitutionality "is 'purely a question of law'" and requires the proponent to "demonstrate that
the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Idaho Dep't of
Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433,441 (2006); accord Lochsa Falls, L.L.c. v. State,

with respect to the endowment lands' beneficiaries, it could not ignore the public auction
mandate.
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147 Idaho 232, 237, 207 P.3d 963, 968 (2008).

"The interpretation of a [constitutional

provision]" is similarly "a question of law over which we exercise free review." State ex reI.

Wasden v. Daicel Chern. Indus., Inc., 141 Idaho 102, 109, 106 P.3d 428, 435 (2005). Whether an
unconstitutional provision is severable from the remainder of a statute also presents a question of
law subject to de novo determination by this Court. See Concerned Taxpayers of Kootenai

County v. Kootenai County, 137 Idaho 496, 498,504-505,50 P.3d 991,993,996-97 (2002).

II.

THE OVERALL STRUCTURE AND TERMINOLOGY OF ARTICLE IX,
SECTION 8 AND THE PARTICULAR LANGUAGE OF ITS THIRD SENTENCE,
ESTABLISH UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT THE
TERM "DISPOSAL"
ENCOMPASSES THE COTTAGE SITE LEASES-A CONSTRUCTION THAT
THIS COURT HAS ENDORSED FOR ALMOST A CENTURY
A.

Applicable Rules Of Constitutional Construction

This Court has held repeatedly that '''[t]he general rules of statutory construction apply to
constitutional provisions generally.'" Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 138,804 P.2d 308,311
(1990) (quoting Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 403, 757 P.2d 664, 666 (1988»; accord

City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 10, 137 P.3d 388,397 (2006). Those rules demand that the
interpretative exercise
begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.
Unless the result is palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature means what is
clearly stated in the statute.

Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 192, 233 P.3d 118, 123 (2010).
Consequently, "[i]n determining the ordinary meaning of the statute, 'effect must be given to all
the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.'"

17

BHC

Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 98, 95,244 P.3d 237, 239 (2010); see also
George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387 (1990)
("[s]tatutes must also be construed as a whole without separating one provision from another").
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional
possibilities but of statutory context" (Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994», and thus a
"fundamental canon of statutory construction [is] that words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme" (Davis v. Mich. Dep't of

Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989»; see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341
(1997) ("[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the
language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context ofthe
statute as a whole"). A provision'S syntax therefore must be examined carefully, as exemplified
by the rule of last antecedent clause under which "a referential or qualifying clause refers solely
to the last antecedent, absent a showing of contrary intent." BHC Intermountain, 150 Idaho
at 96,244 P.3d at 240.
Where a provision is deemed "capable of more than one reasonable construction" after
careful analysis of its overall constitutional or statutory context, this Court has instructed that the
prOVISIOn
be construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. To determine that intent,
we examine not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of
proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history.

Carrier v. Lake Pend OreWe Sch. Dist., 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Resort to these largely non-textual interpretative considerations,
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however, is appropriate only if a court cannot resolve the dispute by reference to the four comers
of the involved provision. Here, as discussed below, the term "disposal" in Article IX, Section 8
unambiguously includes the Land Board's issuance of the cottage site leases. Yet, even were the
contrary true, the external considerations support the same result.
B.

Article IX, Section 8's Text: Absence Of Ambiguity Concerning Inclusion Of
Leases Within Term "Disposal"

The interpretative exercise must begin with Article IX, Section 8's text and its use of the
terms "sale," "rent," "sold," "disposition" and "disposal." The provision in its original form
•

Enjoined the Land Board "to provide for the location, protection, sale or rental of

all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be granted to or acquired by the state by or from
the general government, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such manner
as will secure the maximum possible amount therefor: Provided, that no state lands shall be sold
for less than ten (10) dollars per acre."
•

Enjoined the Legislature from "granting any privileges to persons who may have

settled upon any such public lands, subsequent to the survey thereof by the general government,
by which the amount to be derived by the sale, or other disposition of such lands, shall be
diminished, directly or indirectly."
•

Enjoined the Legislature "to provide by law that the general grants of land made

by congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust,
subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which
said grants of land were made."

19

•

Enjoined the Legislature to "provide for the sale of said lands from time to time

and for the sale of timber on all state lands and for the faithful application of the proceeds thereof
in accordance with the terms of said grants; Provided, that not to exceed twenty-five sections of
school lands shall be sold in anyone year, and to be sold in subdivisions of not to exceed one
hundred and sixty (160) acres to anyone individual, company or corporation."
(Emphasis added in quoted text to relevant terms).9

Several conclusions follow from the

provision's quite considered use of those terms.

First, the opening sentence of Article IX, Section 8 that imposes "the maximum amount
possible therefor" duty explicitly identifies two forms of real property interest transfers: sales
and rentals. The same discrete treatment is accorded the term "sale" or "sold" in the third
sentence with reference to providing for sale of public lands and timber on those lands. The
Framers therefore clearly understood that both forms of transfer could and would take place in
the administration of the trust lands and, as indicated by the "no less than ten (10) dollars per
acre" requirement, referred to one form when they intended to impose a discrete limitation on its
use.

Second, the Framers used the term "disposition" in the following sentence to capture
transactions other than a "sale" of public lands, thereby indicating that the rental of such lands
would be subject to the prohibition against granting privileges to post-survey settlers that would
diminish the amount received from the involved transaction. The juxtaposition of "other" and
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"disposition" reflects that "disposition" is an inclusive term capturing a range of transactions
beyond sales; i.e., use of the term "other disposition" effectively served to negate the canon of

expressio unius est exclusion alterius, since in the term's absence the limitations on the
Legislature's authority in the second sentence would have applied only to sales. See Idaho Press

Club, Inc. v. State Legislature, 142 Idaho 640, 643, 132 P.3d 397, 400 (2006) ("the rule of
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to provisions of the Idaho Constitution
that expressly limit power"). In light of the first sentence, one such fonn of transfer is rental of
endowment land.

Third, the next sentence brings these interpretative strains together by using a variation of
the tenn "disposition" in subjecting public lands to "disposal at public auction" but incorporating
a more specific direction to the Legislature with regard to providing for the sale of public lands,
as well as timber on such lands, and limiting that authority in the concluding proviso. The
Framers, in short, knew how to cabin a particular constitutional mandate in Article IX, Section 8
to sales when they so intended but, as to the public auction requirement, employed the more
expansive "disposal"-a choice of tenninology indicating intent to include both "sales" and
"other disposition[s]." Of equal importance for present purposes, however, is the status of
"disposal" as the antecedent for the preposition phrases that immediately follow and include not
only "at public auction" but also "for the use and benefit of the respective objects for which said
grants ofland were made."

As discussed in note 5 supra, the text of Article IX, Section 8 has been amended in several
respects since its adoption in 1891. None of those modifications, however, has relevance to the

9
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Textual analysis of Article IX, Section 8 therefore leaves no legitimate doubt that the
term "disposal" is not limited to "sales" but to other forms of "disposition" subject to the
provision's restraints on legislative authority.

The district court's limitation of the term to

transactions where the endowment land parcel "is no longer being preserved and held in trust"
(R Addendum, p. 35, L.18) instead conflates the Legislature's duty under the third sentence to
"judiciously locate[] and carefully preserve[] and [hold] in trust" those lands with the separate
obligation to dispose of them "at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective
[beneficiaries]" of the congressional grant. The former clause imposes a general duty on the
Legislature; the later clause is aimed at ensuring that the land's "disposal" by the Land Board is
effected in a manner-"at public auction"------calculated by the Framers to capture market value
and that the revenue so generated accrues to the beneficiaries' interest-a requirement that
attaches no less to when occupation or use of the lands are conveyed to a third party as to when
they are conveyed in fee simple out of state ownership.lO

proper construction of the term "disposal."
10 The Payette Lake Lessees' position below with respect to "disposal" suffered from much the
same difficulty as the district court's construction. They contended that the term should be
measured by reference to the definition given that word by the 1990 edition of Black's Law
Dictionary-i.e., the "sale, pledge, giving away, use, consumption or any other disposition of a
thing"-and argued that "[w]ith regard to real property, a disposal would thus involve the
transfer of one's entire interest in property, otherwise known as a fee simple interest." R Vol.
III, p. 581. Their reliance on a dictionary meaning of "disposal" is misplaced for an obvious
reason: It isolates the term from its overall context in the constitutional provision and fails to
acknowledge that a lease does "dispose" of a valuable real property interest that Article IX,
Section 8 seeks to protect: the right to possession of the particular cottage-site lot. E.g., City of
Lewiston v. Isaman, 19 Idaho 653, 672, 115 P. 494, 501 (1911) (tort liability falls upon tenant
because "'[u]pon the transfer of the entire interest and possession to another, as the duty runs
with land, [liability] would be cast upon the grantee"'); see generally Restatement (Second) of
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c.

Relevant Decisional Authority: Leases As "Disposals"
1.

The IWP Quartet

The application of the public auction requirement to endowment land leasing has drawn
this Court's attention since the early part ofthe last century and leaves no legitimate doubt about
the absence of ambiguity over the inclusion of leases within the term "disposal." The most
recent treatment of this issue appears in the four IWP decisions. In IWP I, the Court found the
Land Board to have acted ultra vires when it issued a lease to an applicant that had failed to bid
in a conflict auction held pursuant to Idaho Code § 58-310:
The Board must find authority in the constitution and statutes for its actions .... No
such authority exists to support the Board's act of granting the lease to a person who did
not place a bid at the conflict auction. Idaho Code § 58-310 requires an auction be held
where, as in this case, there are two persons who have applied to lease the same state
school land.... The rationale behind the requirement of conducting an "auction" is to
solicit competing bids, with the lease being granted to the bid that would, in the
discretion of the Board, "secure the maximum long term financial return" to Idaho's
schools .... The Board does not have the discretion to grant a lease to an applicant who
does not place a bid at an auction, based upon Idaho's constitutional and statutory
mandate that the Board conduct an auction. Idaho Const. art. IX, § 8; I.C. § 58-310.
128 Idaho at 766, 918 P.2d at 1211 (some citations omitted). Although the Court held that the
Land Board's leasing determination violated statutory directives, the Court also expressly relied

Property: Landlord & Tenant § 1.2 (1977) ("[a] landlord-tenant relationship exists only if the
landlord transfers the right to possession of the leased property"). Indeed, the Lessees' proposed
construction of "disposal" would exclude from Article IX, Section 8's reach contracts to
purchase where the State retains ownership of the affected property until the purchaser "mak[es]
complete payment therefor" and no transfer of "fee simple title" either has occurred or
necessarily will occur. Hellerud v. Hauck, 52 Idaho 226, 231-32, 13 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1932)
(title to school trust land under contract to purchase could not be acquired by third party through
adverse possession because State, as seller, retained ownership of legal title and is not subject to
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on Article IX, Section 8's public auction mandate as a co-equal basis for its holding.

It

accordingly began the substantive legal analysis with the following:
IWP contends that the Board violated article IX, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution by
leasing the 640 acres of state public land without requiring a competitive bid for the
lease of the state public land. IWP argues that a party must actually place a bid at a
conflict auction, in order to be considered a qualified applicant for a lease of state public
lands. We agree.
128 Idaho at 764, 918 P.2d at 1209 (emphasis added). Any suggestion that IWP I was not
decided with reference to Article IX, Section 8's public auction requirement asks this Court sub
silentiQ to revisit the explicit holding in the case.

The decision in IWP I assumed additional significance insofar as it prompted the
constitutional amendment approved in the 1998 general election that, inter alia, substituted the
term "sale" for "disposal" in Article IX, Section 8's third sentence. The modification implicitly
recognized that the term "disposal" in the constitutional provision extended beyond "sale" of
endowment land since, absent such a meaning, no need existed for the amendment itself. See,
e.g., Idaho Press Club, 142 Idaho at 643, 132 P.3d at 401 ("[w]e should avoid an interpretation

which would render terms of a constitution surplusage"); Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 457,
195 P.2d 662, 683 (1948) (constitutional "[a]mendments ... are usually adopted by the express
purpose of making changes in the existing system"). This Court concluded in IWP II that the
referendum contained two "'incongruous and essentially unrelated'" amendments and therefore
violated Article XX, Section 2. 133 Idaho at 60, 982 P.2d at 363. It reasoned that "the subject of

defeasance of title under the adverse possession doctrine); accord In re SRBA, 149 Idaho 532,
541,237 P.3d 1, 10 (2010).
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how school endowment land proceeds are invested differs essentially from the subject of whether
auctions should take place regarding only sales, as opposed to leases and sales, of school
endowment lands"). That statement makes express what was otherwise clear: The attempted
amendment to Article IX, Section 8 was directed at obviating the constitutional restriction on
leasing endowment lands without a public auction enforced in IWP 1. 11
This Court invalidated Idaho Code § 58-310B in IWP III under Article IX, Section 8
because it attempted "to provide income to the schools and the state in general" and, in so doing,
violated the constitutional mandate to "'provide by law that the general grants of land made by
congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject
to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said grants
of land were made.'"

133 Idaho at 67, 982 P.2d at 370 (emphasis added by Court). It then

invalidated disqualification of IWP's lease application given the Land Board's reliance on

11 The Payette Lake Lessees argued before the district court that the Legislative Council's
Statements of Meaning and Purpose for the 1998 constitutional amendment contain a concession
by "Idaho's own elected officials ... that the word 'disposal' has historically been interpreted to
mean sale." R Vol. III, p. 589. However, the sentence to which they refer reads in its entirety:
"Although the word 'disposal' has historically been interpreted to mean 'sale,' the definition of
'disposal' is still disputed." IWP II, 133 Idaho at 64, 982 P.2d at 367. The opposition argument
also states that "[t]he amendment will eliminate the constitutional requirement that a lease of
lands ofthe public school endowment must be offered at a public auction." ld These statements
warrant to observations. First, the "historical[]" statement was made without identifying whether
the interpretation referred to was the Legislature's or this Court's. As discussed below in the
text, the Court has long construed "disposal" as including both sale and rental of endowment
land. Second, the opposition statement reflects the position that the proposed constitutional
amendment would modify the scope of the public auction requirement to exclude the leasing of
endowment land-a position entirely consistent with the conclusion that the amendment
responded to and attempted to overrule this Court's decision in IWP 1.
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otherwise impermissible factors identified in § 58-31OB.

133 Idaho at 67-68, 982 P.2d

at 370-71. The Court gave similar effect to § 58-310B's invalidity in IWP IV where, again, the
Board had disqualified IWP's lease application. 133 Idaho at 71,982 P.2d at 374. Although, as
the district court observed, IWP III and IV were concerned with the validity of § 58-310B, the
basis for the decisions was the provision's non-compliance with a phrase-"for the use and
benefit of the respective object for which said grants ofland were made"-whose antecedent was
the noun "disposal." The common denominator in the four IWP decisions, in sum, is the
inclusion of endowment land leases within the scope of the term "disposal" as used in Article IX,
Section 8. 12

12 This Court declined to award attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 in IWP I, apparently
accepting the Board's contention that it had "acted on the basis of its long-standing
interpretations of applicable constitutional and statutory provisions and administrative rules" and
thus possessed "a reasonable basis in law in rejecting IWP's bid." 128 Idaho at 767, 918 P.2d at
1212. Needless to say, that reasonable basis, insofar as it was predicated on the inapplicability of
the public auction requirement in Article IX, Section 8 to leasing determinations, was vitiated by
IWP I as to future decisionmaking. The Court's disposition of the attorney's fee issue also
vitiates the Payette Lake Lessees' contention that the Attorney General Opinion No. 09-01 's
reliance on the IWP litigation as a basis for distinguishing the 1990 legal guideline issued by a
deputy attorney general. R Vol. III, pp. 591. The legal guideline acknowledged that its
conclusion-i.e., that "it is possible to interpret article 9, section 8, as vesting in the legislature
the discretion to lease public lands by methods other than by public auction"-as "somewhat
tentative, given that it is supported only by ambiguous statements of the Idaho Supreme Court,
the delegates to the constitutional convention, and the early legislature." R Clerk's Ex. 11
(Aff. of Phillip S. Oberrecht, Ex. H at p.6). The IWP decisions, in short, clarified what the
deputy attorney general had found uncertain. The analysis in the text concerning the pre-IWP
decisions, moreover, revisits the inquiry undertaken in the nonbinding legal guideline and does
not find ambiguity as to the controlling question of whether "disposal" includes not only sales
but also leases. Attorney General Opinion No. 09-01 likewise found no ambiguity.
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2.

Pre-IWP Decisions

In so construing "disposal," this Court was not writing upon a clean slate. It instead was

adhering to an understanding of Article IX, Section 8 first announced in Tobey v. Bridgewood,
22 Idaho 566, 127 P. 178 (1912). There, the Court considered a quiet title action involving
application of a statute, now codified in Idaho Code § 58-601 without substantive amendment,
that authorized the Land Board to issue a right-of-way to any person "desiring to construct over
or upon any of the lands owned or controlled by the state of Idaho, any ditch, canal, reservoir or
other works for carrying or distributing public waters for any beneficial use." The statute, as
originally adopted in 1901 (1901 Idaho Sess. L. p. 191, § 8), required no compensation for such
rights-of-way but was amended in 1907 to impose a $10 per acre minimum (1907 Idaho Sess. L.
p. 527, § 1). It did not require a public auction as a condition to the right-of-way's interest. The
plaintiff in Tobey had acquired certain lands for reservoir purposes from the Land Board in 1909
by payment of the statutory minimum and compliance with certain other requirements after
being directed by the Board to comply with the statute.
This Court used the dispute to discuss the breadth of the Land Board's authority under
Article IX, Section 8 and the Legislature's authority under the Idaho Constitution's eminent
domain provision, Article I, Section 14. The Court criticized the Board because "an agreement
and contract between [him] and [it] was made which cannot be construed as a lease of state land,
neither is it the purchase of state land at public auction, under the provisions of the Constitution

and the laws of the state, but is wholly without authority of law or legal sanction or authority,
and violated specifically the inhibition as to the authority of the [Board] contained in the
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Constitution and the statutes." 22 Idaho at 580, 127 P. at 183 (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, the Court found the statute itself constitutional because it, along with a
companion provision now codified at Idaho Code § 58-602 providing for the withholding of
lands from sale when the Land Board concludes that their highest value is reservoir use, "in no
way confer upon the [Board] any power that is prohibited by the Constitution, and it was not the
intention of the Legislature in enacting said sections to in any way contravene the constitutional
inhibition, but it was intended to carry out the provisions found in sec. 14 of art. 1 of the
constitution." 22 Idaho at 581-82, 127 P. at 183. It then quoted the predecessor provision to

§ 58-603 for the principle that it exemplified the same use of eminent domain authority.
22 Idaho at 582-83, 127 P. at 184. The Court continued on to reiterate that the two reservoirrelated statutes
were not intended to provide for a method or system of disposing of land belonging to
the state which will have the effect of granting the right to the use or occupancy forever,
or the right to enter upon state land or occupy it for the purpose of use as a reservoir or
in appropriating water thereon, except that such right and use and occupancy is obtained
under the provision of the Constitution and the statutory laws of the state.
22 Idaho at 583, 127 P. at 184. The Court concluded by pointing to two statutes-now codified
at Idaho Code §§ 7-703 and 42-1104 which, in the first instance, identify state property as
subject to taking by eminent domain and, in the other, allow the taking of state property for the
purpose of constructing rights-of-way and "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining any
ditch, canal, conduit or other works for the diversion or carrying of water for any beneficial
use"-as "show[ing] clearly the intent of the Legislature to grant the right to take state land for a
public use, just the same as private property." 22 Idaho at 585, 127 P. at 185. The Board's
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action, in other words, was not sanctioned under Article IX, Section 8 but was authorized under
Article I, Section 14.
Tobey thus left no doubt that Article IX, Section 8, insofar as it relates to the disposition

of endowment lands, applies to the sale or rental of school trust lands but did not restrict the
Legislature's constitutionally-independent power to enact eminent domain laws.

This Court

returned to the same issue several years later in Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Reservoir Co. v. Fisher,
27 Idaho 695, 151 P. 998 (1915), another quiet title action. The plaintiff there acquired a rightof-way in 1903 for purposes of constructing a reservoir under the same statute, as codified prior
to the 1907 amendment, as the plaintiff in Tobey and had completed construction on two of the
three anticipated facilities by 1912 when the defendant acquired the same land from the State
after a public auction.
Chief Justice Sullivan, the only remammg member of the Tobey Court, wrote the
principal opinion reversing the district court's judgment in the defendant's favor. His opinion
focused on the potential conflict between Article IX, Section 8 and the eminent domain provision
in Article I, Section 14. The opinion sought to reconcile the two constitutional sections by
restricting each provision's scope. The opinion devoted virtually all of its substantive analysis to
Article I, Section 14 and the related eminent domain statute and held that "under the provisions
of the Constitution which clearly contemplates the subjection of state lands to certain public
uses, the title in fee does not pass to the condenmor under the eminent domain or other
proceedings provided by the Legislature for the subjection of state lands to public uses."
27 Idaho at 704, 151 P. at 1001; see also 27 Idaho at 709, 151 P. at 1002 (under Article I, Section
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14 "only the necessary use of the land for reservoir or dam purposes is taken which may result in
the perpetual use of such lands for that purpose, or only a temporary use, and the title in fee to
the land remains in the state"). It further reasoned that "[b]y holding that [the] provisions of
[Article IX,] Section 8 are applicable when the state parts with the fee, and not where it grants an
easement, the sections of the Constitution in regard to the sale of school lands and of eminent
domain can be made effective and harmonious." 27 Idaho at 705, 151 P. at 1001. The principal
opinion addressed Tobey quite briefly. It characterized the earlier decision as having "proceeded
upon the theory that the fee-simple title was taken or disposed of by the state for the public use
therein mentioned" but nevertheless overruled "the doctrine therein . . . that is contrary to the
views expressed in this opinion." 27 Idaho at 709, 151 P. at 1002.
Justice Morgan concurred in the principal opinion but solely "upon the ground that [the
involved right-of-way statute] provides only for taking an easement or right of way upon or
across school lands" rather than "for the sale or leasing of such lands" and thus did not
contravene Article IX, Section 8. 27 Idaho at 709, 151 P. 1002 (emphasis added). Justice Budge
dissented, reasoning that "the Legislature is prohibited from enacting any law which provides for
the disposition of lands granted to the state by an act of Congress in any manner than as
expressly provided in the Act of Admission and in the Constitution; that is, by sale at public
auction." 27 Idaho at 719, 151 P. at 1006. The dissenting opinion additionally disagreed with
the proposition that only an easement had been granted; instead, "[t]he taking of the state land in
question for reservoir purposes is, in effect and under [the eminent domain] statute, the acquiring
of a fee-simple title to said lands." 27 Idaho at 720, 151 P. at 1006. Consequently, all Justices
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participating in Idaho-Iowa Lateral agreed that, where the sale or leasing of endowment lands
occurs and eminent domain authority has not been exercised, the public auction strictures in
Article IX, Section 8 apply.
This Court returned to the public auction requirement subsequently in East Side Blaine
County Live Stock Association v. State Board, 34 Idaho 807, 198 P.760 (1921). There, the Court
affirmed issuance of mandamus relief against the Land Board for failing to hold a public auction
over a lease of state lands. It reasoned in part that
The dominant purpose of these provisions of the Constitution and of the statutes enacted
thereunder is that the state shall receive the greatest possible amount for the lease of
school lands for the benefit of school funds, and for this reason competitive bidding is
made mandatory .... The provisions of the Constitution and [leasing] statutes above
referred to made it the duty of the State Board of Land Commissioners, under the facts
and circumstances of this case, to offer the lease of said lands at auction to the highest
bidder, and the Board, in refusing to do so, failed in the performance of an act which the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from its official position. In refusing to do so, its action
ran counter to the provisions of the Constitution and statutes.
34 Idaho at 814-15,198 P. at 763. The IWP I Court concisely summarized the issue in East Side
as "whether school land leases had to be offered at a public auction, pursuant to Idaho's
constitutional and statutory mandate[,]" and as holding "that state lands are to be 'leased at
public auction to the highest bidder therefore. ,,, 128 Idaho at 764, 918 P.2d at 1209.
These seven opinions serve chiefly to establish what a textual analysis of Article IX,
Section 8 otherwise shows: The term "disposal" encompasses not only the sale of endowment
lands but also their leasing.

The constitutional provision therefore requires that (1) the

endowment lands be sold or rented at public auction, at least where more than one bidder exists,
and that the proceeds be used for the benefit of the lands' beneficiaries. The 1990 Act, however,
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foreclosed the Land Board and the IDL from conducting such auctions.

The legislative

proscription thereby removes the ability of, and any incentive for, a potential applicant who is
not an existing lessee to submit an application. In so doing, the Act ran directly counter to the
explicit language of Article IX, Section 8 and imposed on the Board a duty-i. e., to make
"market rent" assessments-that the Constitution's drafters committed to public auction process
in the fust instance.

Section 58-31OA's substitution of the "market rent" determination for

public auction requirement exceeds the Legislature's constitutional authority.
D.

Article IX, Section 8: Constitutional Convention Deliberations

No need exists to go beyond the language of Article IX, Section 8 and its construction by
this Court to determine the scope of the term "disposal." Read in context, the term is not
.ambiguous. Even were the contrary true, the only potential source of interpretative assistance is
the deliberations of the 1889 Constitutional Convention.

A review of those deliberations,

however, supports the same conclusion as the one arrived at through a straightforward
examination of Article IX, Section 8's text.
The debate on Article IX, Section 8 took place on July 23, 1889. I.W. Hart, Proceedings
and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho 1889 703-12, 730-65 (1910) ("I Hart").

Although extended and procedurally confused (see id at 758-59), the delegates' discussions are
relatively clear in several respects relevant here. A principal point of controversy was a series of
amendments or substitutes to amend the proposed provision by foreclosing sale of endowment
lands. E.g., id at 704-06 (Del. Parker), 709-11 (Del. Vineyard), 730-31 (Del. Vineyard), 733-34
(Del. Anderson). None was adopted. E.g., id at 751-52 (Del. Claggett substitute); id at 761-62
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(Del. Parker amendment). Their non-adoption, however, says nothing about the meaning of
"disposal" because, as discussed above, Section 8 expressly contemplated both the sale and
rental of endowment lands.
More germane were one successful amendment and two proposed but unsuccessful
amendments to the penultimate formulation of the provision. The successful amendment was
offered by Delegate Gray and substituted "rental" for "other disposition" in the provision's first
sentence. 1 Hart at 762-63. He deemed the term "other disposition" as "a little too uncertain"
and giving the legislature the power to mortgage-a grant of authority that he opposed.

Id at 762. The amendment thus pared the broad term "disposition" down to one specific type of
transaction.

It makes no sense to contend that the same term-"disposition"-in the next

sentence does not include rentals. The first unsuccessful amendment would have stricken the
words "at public auction" in the third sentence and would have replaced the word "sale" with
"disposition" in the clause that reads "the [legislature] shall provide for the sale of said lands
from time to time." Id at 763. The other unsuccessful amendment sought to replace the word
"disposal" with "disposition" in the third sentence.

I Hart at 764.

Rejection of the first

amendment removed any doubt that the Framers intended all "disposal[s]" to be subject to the
public auction requirement and that the term "disposition" encompassed transactions in addition
to "sales"-a conclusion implicit from the use of "disposition" in the preceding sentence and the
successful amendment to the first sentence. 13 Non-adoption of the second amendment supports

13 The "public auction" requirement like the land trust requirement reflected a conscious choice
by the Constitutional Convention delegates to insulate management of endowment lands from

33

the conclusion that the term "disposal" was employed to capture both sales and "other
disposition[s]" and thereby to avoid the confusion, given the second sentence's reference to "sale
or other disposition," that simple use of "disposition" might have caused. The Convention's
actions on these amendments thus underscores what Article IX, Section 8's plain text otherwise
indicates: The Framers used the term "sale" when they desired to impose a specific requirement
on that form of real property transaction and used the term "disposal" in the third sentence
because they desired to capture not only sales but also other types of real property transactions
including, at the least, the rental of endowment lands.
E.

Invalidity of § 58-31OA In Its Entirety: Non-Severability

The remaining issue is whether the failure of § 58-310A to comply with the public
auction requirement invalidates the statute as a whole.

Resolution of that issue turns on

severability principles; i.e., whether '''the invalid portion [of § 58-310A] may be stricken without
affecting the remainder of the statute.'" In re SRBA, 128 Idaho 246, 263, 912 P.2d 614, 631

the inevitable political pressure to grant favorable terms to potential purchasers or lessees of
these lands. Dennis C. Colson, Idaho Endowment Lands and the Idaho Constitution 1-9 (2011),
available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/20 ll1interim/resources0829_0830_
colson.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). While the Convention delegates were willing to trust the
Land Board and the Legislature to manage the lands, they thought it prudent to impose
limitations on their powers. "The land was to be managed according to private trust law and free
from political influence and considerations." Id. The "public auction" requirement was viewed
as one of the tools to prevent individuals from pillaging the endowment lands for their personal
benefit. In modem economic terms, the phenomena of interest groups seeking special favors
from government decision makers is referred to as "rent seeking." Henry E. Butler and
Christopher R. Drahozal, Economic Analysis for Lawyers 125 (2006). Rent seeking occurs when
a small group of individuals are able to obtain monopoly rights to a government resource such as
endowment lands at the expense in this instance of the beneficiaries.
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(1995) (quoting Voyles v. City o/Nampa, 97 Idaho 597, 600, 548 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1976». The
answer to this question is clearly no.
Section 58-31OA contains two directions to Land Board: (1) "The board shall reject any
and all pending and future conflict applications filed under sections 58-307 and 58-310, Idaho
Code, for single family, recreational cottage site and homesite leases (subsection 2); and (2) "[i]n
the absence of the conflict application and auction procedure in the single family, recreational
cottage site and homesite lease, and lease renewal process, the board shall insure that each leased
lot generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease" (subsection (3». No dispute
exists, therefore, that the duty imposed on the Board to determine "market rent" is the quid pro

quo for the "absence of the conflict application and auction procedure" provided under Idaho
Code § 58-310. The market-rent determination, in other words, embodies the surrogate method
for identifying what a reasonable buyer would pay.
Since the exception from the obligation to conduct a public auction when competing
applications for a leasehold is invalid, "the remaining provisions of th[e] legislation [cannot
function] as the legislature intended." In re SRBA, 128 Idaho at 264, 912 P.2d at 632. The
Legislature obviously recognized the reciprocal nature of these directions by not including a
severability provision in 1990 Idaho Session Laws Chapter 187. Compare In re SRBA at id.
("[w]hen determining whether the remaining provisions in a statute can be severed from the
unconstitutional sections, this Court will, when possible, recognize and give effect to the intent
of the Legislature as expressed through a severability clause in the statute"), with Concerned

Taxpayers of Kootenai County v. Kootenai County, 137 Idaho 496, 501, 50 P.3d 991, 996 (2002)
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("(t]he Resort County Act does not contain a severability clause, which suggests that the
legislature intended for the Act to stand or fall as a cohesive unit, rather than containing
severable provisions"). The entire statute consequently must be invalidated.

CONCLUSION
Idaho Code § 58-31 OA violates the public auction requirement in Article IX, Section 8 of
the Idaho Constitution and is invalid in its entirety. The judgment of the district court in Wasden
should be reversed.
DATED this 22nd day of December 2011.
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
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APPENDIX A
IDAHO CODE § 58-310A

58-310A. Legislative findings and purposes - Leases of single family,
recreational cottage sites and homesites not subject to conflict application and
auction provisions.
(1) The legislature of the state ofIdaho fInds:
(a) That from time to time single family, recreational cottage site and
homesite leases have been the target of conflict applications to lease said premises and
property;
(b) That single family, recreational cottage sites and homesites have
typically been held by the same family, sometimes for as long as fIfty (50) years;
(c) That conflict applications for a lease require the state board of land
commissioners to hold an auction between the applicants and award the lease to the
highest bidder;
(d) That existing statutes allow the board no discretion in rejecting
applications, and only limited discretion in rejecting bids, notably for collusion or similar
irregularities in the bidding process;
(e) That, in the case of single family, recreational cottage site and
homesite leases, the conflict application and auction procedure have caused considerable
consternation and dismay to the existing lessee at the prospect oflosing a long-time lease;
(f) That, although conflict applications have been fIled from time to time,
the board has never held a conflict auction or realized any direct revenue from such
applications;
(g) That section 8, article IX, of the constitution of the state of Idaho
provides that the board manage state endowment lands in such manner as will secure the
maximum long-term fInancial return to the institution to which granted or to the state if
not specifically granted;
(h) That maximum long-term fmancial returns to the institutions to which
granted are best obtained through stable leases at market rent.
(2) It is hereby declared that leases for single family, recreational cottage sites
and homesites shall not be subject to the conflict application and auction provisions of
sections 58-307 and 58-310, Idaho Code. The board shall reject any and all pending and
future conflict applications fIled under sections 58-307 and 58-310, Idaho Code, for
single family, recreational cottage site and homesite leases.
(3) In the absence of the conflict application and auction procedure in the single
family, recreational cottage site and homesite lease, and lease renewal process, the board
shall insure that each leased lot generates market rent throughout the duration of the
lease.

APPENDIXB
IDAHO CONSTITUTION ARTICLE IX, SECTION 8

Article IX, Section 8
Location and disposition of public lands.
It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for the
location, protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be
granted to or acquired by the state by or from the general government, under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the maximum
long term fmancial return to the institution to which granted or to the state if not
specifically granted; provided, that no state lands shall be sold for less than the appraised
price. No law shall ever be passed by the legislature granting any privileges to persons
who may have settled upon any such public lands, subsequent to the survey thereof by the
general government, by which the amount to be derived by the sale, or other disposition
of such lands, shall be diminished, directly or indirectly. The legislature shall, at the
earliest practicable period, provide by law that the general grants of land made by
congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust,
subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for
which said grants of land were made, and the legislature shall provide for the sale of said
lands from time to time and for the sale of timber on all state lands and for the faithful
application of the proceeds thereof in accordance with the terms of said grants; provided,
that not to exceed one hundred sections of state lands shall be sold in anyone year, and to
be sold in subdivisions of not to exceed three hundred and twenty acres of land to any
one individual, company or corporation. The legislature shall have power to authorize
the state board of land commissioners to exchange granted or acquired lands of the state
on an equal value basis for other lands under agreement with the United States, local
units of government, corporations, companies, individuals, or combinations thereof.
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PROCEEDINGS

23

This matter came before the Court on: (1) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial

24

Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims; (2) the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial

25

Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims; and (3) the Attorney General's Motion for
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Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality of I.C. § 58-310A.
2
3

argument, the Court made a preliminary ruling on the Constitutionality of I.C. § 58-310A
and the remaining matters were taken under advisement.

BACKGROUND

4
5
6
7

After hearing oral

The Idaho Department of Lands is the executive agency established to
administer State endowment lands.

George Bacon is the Director of the Idaho

Department of Lands. Under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, the Land

B

Board is the trustee of public schools, normal schools and state hospital endowment
9

lands. The Land Board consists of five members: the Governor, the Secretary of State,
10

the Attorney General, the Controller and the Superintendent of Public Instruction.
11
12

The Land Board is trustee for almost 2.5 million acres of endowment lands

13

granted to Idaho at statehood for the purpose of supporting public schools and other

14

public institutions. Idaho's endowment trust assets include 354 lots near Priest Lake

15

and 168 lots near Payette Lake. The State leases the lots, and lessees are authorized

16

to construct and own single-family residences on the sites.

17

18

The lots are generally

referred to as "cottage sites."
In 2001, the Payette Lessees or their predecessors in interest entered into ten-

19

year leases for cottage sites near Payette Lake (,,2001 Leases"). The 2001 Leases
20

provide for annual rent of 2.5% of the current fee simple value of the leased premises,
21

22
23

adjusted annually based on the values determined by Valley County. The 2001 Leases
expressly provide that they terminate on December 31, 2010.

24

In recognition of the fact that the 2001 Leases were set to expire on December

25

31, 2010, the Land Board had been working for several years to determine the terms
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for new leases that were to go into effect on January 1, 2011. The Land Board began
2

this process in 2007 by establishing a Cottage Site Subcommittee ("Subcommittee"),

3

which consisted of Secretary of State, Ben Ysursa, and Superintendent of Public

4

Instruction, Tom Luna.

5

After several years of study and after consideration of comments from affected

6

parties, the Land Board reached a decision on the terms of new leases to begin in

7
B

2011. On March 16, 2010, in a 3-2 vote, the Land Board voted to implement a 4%
lease rate, effective January 1, 2011. The 4% rate was to be based on the average

9

value of the leased land over the prior ten years and would have been phased in over
10

five years.
11
12
13

On March 31, 2010, the Idaho Department of Lands mailed each cottage site
lessee an Application for Use Form, which included a cottage site lease template for a

14

term beginning January 1, 2011.

15

provisions approved by the [Land Board] at their March 16, 2010 meeting." On June

16

30, 2010, the Idaho Department of Lands further notified each cottage site lessee of

17

what his or her rent would be for the 2011 year under the terms of the new lease.

18

This lease template incorporated the "rental rate

On December 2, 2010, the Idaho Attorney General filed a Complaint for

19

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, which challenged (1) the constitutionality of I.C. § 5820

310A and (2) the Land Board's March 16, 2010 decision to implement the new lease
21

22

23

rate. The primary reason for the Declaratory and Injunctive relief was to prevent the
issuance of ten year leases with these provisions contained in the new leases. The

24

Attorney General also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which was based

25

exclusively on the constitutionality of I. C. § 58-31 OA.
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The lawsuit filed by the Payette Lessees is one of five recent lawsuits, including
2

the suit challenging the constitutionality of I.C. § 58-310A, which was before Judge Bail

3

before the case was consolidated with this action. The first cause of action regarding

4

the cottage sites was a Petition for Writ of Prohibition that the Attorney General filed

5

with the Idaho Supreme Court contending that the lease rate adopted by the Land

6

Board at its March 16, 2010 meeting for the 2011-2021 leases failed to secure the

7

8

maximum long term financial return for the endowment lands beneficiaries as mandated
under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. The Land Board sought dismissal

9

of the Petition for Writ of Prohibition. The Payette Lake Cabin Owner's Association
10

obtained permission to participate in the Idaho Supreme Court action as amicus curiae
11
12

13

and to submit a brief in opposition to the petition.

The petition was subsequently

dismissed on the basis that the Attorney General possessed another adequate remedy

14

in the form of a declaratory judgment action. See Wasden ex reI. State v. Idaho State

15

Board of Land Comm'rs, 150 Idaho 547, 249 P.3d 346. 353 (2010).

16

On December 2, 2010, the Idaho Attorney General filed suit against the

17

Defendants in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in

18

Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2010-23751. In the Attorney General's Complaint for

19

Declaratory Injunctive Relief that was filed in Ada County Case No. CV-OC-201020

23751, which was later consolidated with this case, the Attorney General asserted that
21
22

23

Idaho Code § 58-310A violates Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution by
providing of the leasing of certain lands held in trust under the Article IX, Section 8 by

24

the State of Idaho and described as single family, recreational cottage sites and home

25

sites without being subject to conflict and auction provisions of Idaho Code §§ 58-307

26
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and 310. On December 17, 2010, Judge Bail entered an injunction in that case.
2

Subsequent to the Injunction, the Land Board met on December 21,2010 at a

3

regular meeting in Boise, Idaho. At that meeting, the Land Board voted to offer existing

4

Lessees of cottage sites a one-year lease under the terms and conditions of the

5

existing lease, including rent calculated at the 2.5% rate. The Land Board also

6

approved a second motion that cottage site leases be offered in 2012 for a ten-year

7

8

term, at a rental rate of 4% of current market value of the leased premises. Finally, the
Land Board voted to clarify that adoption of the second motion superseded the earlier

9

decision made by the Land Board on March 16,2010.
10

Plaintiff Lessees

filed

this lawsuit against

the

Idaho Board

of Land

11

12

Commissioners and George Bacon, In his official capacity as Director of the Idaho

13

Department of Lands, for breaching Lessees' existing lease contracts with the

14

Defendants and for committing statutory and constitutional violations. Lessees allege

15

that the Defendants breached the terms of the leases when they imposed new leases

16

with new terms on the Lessees, in violation of the renewal provisions of the existing

17

leases. Lessees also allege that Defendants acted in violation of I.C. § 58-310A and

18

Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution when they imposed a new rent formula.

19

LEGAL STANDARD
20

Summary judgment will be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, and
21

22

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

23

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

24

matter of law." I.R.C.P.56(c). When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial

25

court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-moving party and draw all

26
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reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West Homeowner's
2

Ass'n. v. Bear Lake County, 118 Idaho 343, 346, 796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990). The

3

motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if

4

reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokot, 117 Idaho 963,

5

793 P.2d 195 (1990).

6

7
8

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
rests with the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 531,
887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). If the moving party meets that burden, the party who

9

resists summary judgment has the responsibility to place in the record before the court
10

the existence of controverted material facts that require resolution at trial. Sparks v. St.
11

12

Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 508, 768 P.2d 768, 771 (1988). The

13

resisting party may not rely on his pleadings or merely assert the existence of facts

14

which might support his legal theory. Id. He must establish the existence of those facts

15

by deposition, affidavit, or otherwise. /d.; I.R.C.P. 56(e).

16

affidavits must be made on personal knowledge and must set forth such facts as would

17

18

Supporting and opposing

be admissible in evidence. I.R.C.P.56(e).
A mere scintilla of evidence or a slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to

19

withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730
20

P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986).

Moreover, the existence of disputed facts will not defeat

21
22

summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

23

existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he will bear the burden of

24

proof at trial. Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426,816 P.2d 982, 983 (1991).

25
26
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DISCUSSION
2

Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims

3

The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on their breach

4

of contract claims because the Defendants have breached the renewal terms of the

5

Plaintiffs' cottage site leases. The Plaintiffs also argue that they are entitled to partial

6

summary judgment allowing them to elect their remedy in this matter, either: (1)

7

granting them specific performance to continue in possession of the leased premises

8

during the renewal period under the existing lease terms, including the rental rate
9

formula; or (2) allowing them to surrender possession of the leased premises and
10

directing the Defendants to pay the Plaintiffs compensation for the fair market value of
11

12

any improvements on the leased premises.

13

More specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that the leases unambiguously provide

14

Plaintiffs a right to renew the existing leases because although Section C.1.1 states that

15

renewals may be granted at the Lessor's discretion, Section K.1.4.b provides that

16

approval of a request for renewal shall not be unreasonably withheld. Furthermore, the

17

18

Plaintiffs cite numerous cases from other jurisdictions indicating that where a lease
covenant for renewal is general and does not state the terms of the renewal lease, the

19

new lease is to be upon the same terms and conditions as the old lease, including any
20

terms regarding rent. As such, it is the Plaintiffs' position that they should be allowed to
21

22
23

continue in possession of the leased premises during the renewal period under the
existing lease terms, including the rental rate formula.

24

The Defendants respond that the 2001 leases do not grant the Plaintiffs a right

25

to renew the 2001 leases at all, much less at the 2.5% lease rate. Rather, the 2001

26
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leases provide that a renewal "may be granted by the [Land Board]." According to the
2

Defendants, Section K.1.4 deals only with the Land Board's responsibility for

3

purchasing improvements in the event that a lessee's lease-renewal application is

4

denied and says nothing about the Land Board's otherwise preserved discretion to

5

formulate the terms of the lease applied for. It is the Defendants' position that the Land

6

Board was merely trying to offer to renew the leases at a rental rate that the Land

7

8

Board thought would satisfy its constitutional and statutory responsibilities.
In addition, the Defendants argue that the interpretation of the 2001 leases

9

offered by the Plaintiffs would be contrary to Idaho law. The Defendants argue that the
10

Land Board has no authority to contractually agree to grant the lessees an automatic
11

12
13

right to renew at the existing rental rate because the Land Board is constitutionally
bound to lease the cottage sites "in such manner as will secure the maximum long-term

14

financial return." Idaho Const., Art. IX, § 8. The Defendants also point out the fact that

15

the Legislature has instructed the Land Board to charge "market rent" in accordance

16

with I.C. § 58-310A. Therefore, the Defendants are requesting summary judgment in

17

their favor on Counts I and II of the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

18

The Defendants are also seeking summary judgment because the Plaintiffs'

19

exclusive remedy for reviewing the Land Board's decisions related to the cottage sites
20

is through a petition for judicial review under the APA.

The Plaintiffs' Amended

21

Complaint alleges that "[b]ased on the last correspondence Plaintiffs received from the
22

23

Department of Lands, dated March 31, 2010, which included a draft of the new lease,

24

Plaintiffs believe the renewal leases will contain new and different terms than those

25

contained in the current leases, including but not limited to the increased rental rate

26
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formula of 4% of land value." The Land Board's March 16, 2010 action has been
2

superseded by the motions approved at the December 21, 2010 meeting. Therefore,

3

the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' remedy, to the extent that they are aggrieved

4

by the Land Board's December action, lies in an APA based judicial review proceeding

5

challenging the Land Board's December action.

6
7

8

The Plaintiffs respond that the Defendants are misconstruing the Plaintiffs'
breach of contract claims and that their claims do not fall under the APA. The Plaintiffs
argue that rather than challenging the administrative process leading to the Defendants'

9

decisions on December 21 , 2010, their breach of contract claims are instead concerned
10

with the effect of those decisions on the Defendants' contracts with the Plaintiffs. More
11

12

specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that their contract claims are not challenging the validity

13

of the Land Board's actions and that the Land Board's December 21,2010 decisions do

14

not constitute orders reviewable under the APA because those decisions did not

15

concern the lease rates that would be offered to specific individuals and therefore do

16

not constitute a reviewable order under the IAPA.

17
18

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Land Board "is an 'agency' as
defined by I.C. § 67-5201 (2) and the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the State

19

Board of Land Commissioners," and that the Land Board's decisions are subject to
20

judicial review. Idaho Watersheds Project, Inc. v. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 128 Idaho
21.

761,764,918 P.2d 1206, 1209 (1996). Furthermore, uO]udicial review of agency action
22

23

24

shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter unless other provision of law is
applicable to the particular matter." I.C. § 67-5270(1).

25

26
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I.C. § 67-5201(3) defines "Agency action" as:
2
3
4

(a) The whole or part of a rule or order;

(b) the failure to issue a rule or order; or
(c) An agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any duty placed on
it by law.

5

As such, the Land Board's December 21, 2010 is subject to judicial review
6

7

because it is an agency action that determined the rights of the cottage site Lessees.

8

See I.C. § 67-5201(12) (defining "Order" as "an agency action of particular applicability

9

that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of

10

one (1) or more specific persons.").

11

was the Land Board's performance of, or failure to perform, any duty placed on it by law

12
13

Furthermore, the December 21, 2010, decision

based on the mandates placed on the Land Board by Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution and I.C. § 58-310A.

14

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a party must exhaust administrative
15

remedies "before a district court has jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues." Lochsa
16

17
18

Falls, L.L.G. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 240, 207 P.3d 963, 971 (2009) (citing American
Falls Reservoir Dist. NO.2. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 871, 154

19

P.3d 433, 442 (2007)). The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that "in employment

20

actions tort claims must first be pursued through the administrative body." Nation v.

21

State, Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 193, 158 P.3d 953, 969 (2007) (citing

22
23

Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 236-38, 786 P.2d 1136 (Ct. App. 1990)).

It logically follows that the doctrine of exhaustion should also apply where a party may

24

have both an administrative remedy under the APA and a claim for breach of contract.
25

Here, the Plaintiffs have pled a cause of action that could have a potential
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION - CASE NO. CV 2010-436C - PAGE 10

2011/06/06 16:49:59

12

/21

remedy under either the APA or general contract principles. However, "important policy
2

considerations underlie the requirement for exhausting administrative remedies, such

3

as providing the opportunity for mitigating or curing errors without judicial intervention,

4

deferring to the administrative processes established by the Legislature and the

5

administrative body, and the sense of comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the

6

administrative body." White v. Bannock County Comm'rs, 139 Idaho 396, 401-02, 80

7

8

P.3d 332, 337-38 (2003).
Based on these considerations the Plaintiffs should be required to exhaust their

9

administrative remedies before pursuing their breach of contract claims. Therefore, the
10

Court will grant the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
11

12

13
14

Contract Claims on Counts I and II of the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and require the
Plaintiffs to first pursue those claims under the Administrative Procedures Act.

Attorney General's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality of
I.C. § 58-310A

15

The Attorney General argues that I.C. § 58-310A is unconstitutional because the
16

17

statute permits the issuance of cottage site leases without resorting to conflict auctions,

18

which they contend are required for State land leases under Article IX, Section 8, of the

19

Idaho Constitution. The Plaintiffs respond that the Attorney General's Motion should be

20

denied because I.C. § 58-310A is capable of a constitutional interpretation and the

21

Attorney General has failed to overcome the very significant burden required for

22
23

demonstrating that a statute is unconstitutional on its face.
"A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional 'on its face' or 'as applied' to

24

the party's conduct." American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2. v. Idaho Dep't of Water
25

Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433, 441 (2007) (quoting State v. Korsen,
26
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"Generally, a facial challenge is

mutually exclusive from an as applied challenge." American Falls, 143 Idaho at 870,

3

154 P.3d at 441 (citing Korsen 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P .3d at 132. "A facial challenge to

4

a statute or rule is 'purely a question of law.'" American Falls, 143 Idaho at 870, 154

5

P.3d at 441 (quoting State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195,197,969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998)).

6
7

In order "[f]or a facial constitutional challenge to succeed, the party must
demonstrate that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." American Fal/s,

8

143 Idaho at 870, 154 P.3d at 441 (citing Korsen 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132)
9

(emphasis in original). "In other words, 'the challenger must establish that no set of
10

circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.''' American Fal/s, 143 Idaho
11

12

at 870, 154 P.3d at 441 (quoting Korsen 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132).

"In

13

contrast, to prove a statute is unconstitutional 'as applied', the party must only show

14

that, as applied to the defendant's conduct, the statute is unconstitutional." Id.

15

district court should not rule that a statute is unconstitutional 'as applied' to a particular

16

case until administrative proceedings have concluded and a complete record has been

17

"A

developed." American Falls, 143 Idaho at 870,154 P.3d at 441 (citing I.C. § 67-5277).

18

Here, the Attorney General has challenged the constitutionality of I.C. § 58-310A on its
19

face. I.C. § 58-310 provides that:
20
21
22

23

24

Except as otherwise authorized in sections 58-310A and 58-31 DB, Idaho
Code:
(1) When two (2) or more persons apply to lease the same land, the
director of the department of lands, or his agent, shall, at a stated time,
and at such place as he may designate, auction off and lease the land to
the applicant who will pay the highest premium bid therefor, the annual
rental to be established by the state board of land commissioners.

25

I.C. § 58-31 OA(2) provides that:
26
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4

It is hereby declared that leases for single family, recreational cottage
sites and homesites shall not be subject to the conflict application and
auction provisions of sections 58-307 and 58-310, Idaho Code. The board
shall reject any and all pending and future conflict applications filed under
sections 58-307 and 58-310, Idaho Code, for single family, recreational
cottage site and homesite leases.

5

The Attorney General's position is that I.C. § 58-310A is unconstitutional on its

6

face because the statutory provision exempts the cottage sites from the public auction

2

3

7
8

requirement contained in Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution.

Article IX,

Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution provides that:

9
10
11

12

13
14

15
16
17
18

It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for
the location, protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which
may hereafter be granted to or acquired by the state by or from the general
government, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in
such manner as will secure the maximum long term financial return to the
institution to which granted or to the state if not specifically granted;
provided, that no state lands shall be sold for less than the appraised price.
No law shall ever be passed by the legislature granting any privileges to
persons who may have settled upon any such public lands, subsequent to
the survey thereof by the general government, by which the amount to be
derived by the sale, or other disposition of such lands, shall be diminished,
directly or indirectly. The legislature shall, at the earliest practicable period,
provide by law that the general grants of land made by congress to the state
shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject
to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object
for which said grants of land were made ... ,

19

As a threshold issue, the Court must first determine whether the public auction

20

requirement contained in Article IX, Section 8 even applies to a lease of state lands. In

21

general, "the statutory rules of construction apply to the interpretation of constitutional

22

provisions." State ex rei. Kempthorne v. Blaine County, 139 Idaho 348, 350, 79 P.3d

23

707,709 (2003) (citing Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 138,804 P.2d 308, 311

24

(1990); Lewis v. Woodall, 72 Idaho 16, 18,236 P.2d 91, 93 (1951); Higer v. Hansen, 67
25

Idaho 45,52, 170 P.2d 411,415 (1946)). Furthermore, "[c]ourts are obligated to seek
26
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an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality." Ada County Highway
2

Dis!. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332

3

(2008). As such, "any doubt concerning interpretation of a statute is to be resolved in

4

favor of that which will render the statute constitutional." Urban Renewal Agency of City

5

of Rexburg v. Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 222 P.3d 467 (2009) (quoting Olsen v. J.A.

6

Freeman Co., 1171daho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990)).

7

The parties in this case have offered two possible interpretations of the term

8

"disposal" contained in Article IX, Section 8. If the term "disposal" includes leases, I.C.
9

§ 58-310A is unconstitutional on its face because it exempts the cottage sites from a
10

public auction.

If the term "disposal" does not include leases, I.C. § 58-310A is

11
12

constitutional unless the Attorney General can establish that no set of circumstances

13

exists under which the conflict auction exemption contained in I.C. § 58-310A could

14

possibly "secure the maximum long term financial return" on the cottage site leases.

15

As stated previously, Article IX, Section 8 provides that state endowment lands

16

must be "carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction .... "

17
18

The Courts understanding of the term "disposal" in that context is that state land is only
disposed of when it is no longer being preserved and held in trust.

"A lease is a

19

particular kind of contract wherein (generally) a leasehold interest in realty is given in
20

return for a promise to pay rent periodically." Krasselt v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124, 125,
21

22

578 P.2d 240, 241 (1978). A lessee has both contract rights and a limited ownership

23

interest in the real property. Id. Although the cottage sites at issue in this case have

24

been leased, those lands are still being preserved and held in trust which means that

25

they have not been disposed of. Furthermore, the plain meaning of the term "disposal"

26
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does not encompass partial conveyances of real property such as leases.
2

Therefore,

the Court will find that public auctions are not required for leases of public lands

3

because the term "disposal" contained in Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution

4

does not include leases.

5

Having determined that leased public lands are not subject to the mandatory

6

public auction requirement for the disposal of public lands under Article IX, Section 8,

7

the Court must still address the issue of whether there is any set of circumstances

8

under which not subjecting the cottage sites to a conflict auction could still result in

9

securing "the maximum long term financial return" on the cottage site leases for the
10

beneficiaries of those state endowment lands.
11
12

The Attorney General relies heavily on three cases that are referred to as the

13

Idaho Watershed cases for his argument that I.C. § 58-310A is unconstitutional. Idaho

14

Watershed I was decided in 1996 and addressed the issue of whether the Land Board

15

was permitted under I.C. § 58-310B to award a grazing rights to an applicant who did

16

not bid at the statutorily required conflict auction. Idaho Watersheds Project, Inc. v.

17

State Bd. of Land Comm'rs ("fWP 1'),128 Idaho 761,766,918 P.2d 1206, 1211 (1996).

18

I. C. § 58-310B included an additional factor in the award of grazing leases and that was

19

the interests of the State of Idaho in general, which went well beyond the provisions of
20

Article IX, Section 8 provisions for specific beneficiaries. In that case, the Idaho
21

22
23

Supreme Court held that while the Land Board had broad discretion to determine what
constituted the maximum long term financial return for schools, the Board did not have

24

the legal ability to reject the sale bid placed at a conflict auction and grant the lease to

25

someone who appeared but did not bid. See id. at 765-66, 918 P .2d at 1210-11.

26
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The Attorney General focuses on a concluding sentence in that decision that
2

states that "[t]he Board does not have the discretion to grant a lease to an applicant

3

who does not place a bid at an auction, based upon Idaho's constitutional and statutory

4

mandate that the Board conduct an auction."

5

Constitution does not appear to have been necessary to the Court's ultimate

6

determination in that case. The Court's holding was based primarily on I.C. § 58-310B

7

8

This limited reference to the Idaho

and at no point in the decision did the Court hold that any lease of state lands must be
subject to public auction in order to secure the maximum long term financial return.

9

The Attorney General also relies on East Side Blaine County Live Stock AssJn v.
10

State Bd. of Land Comm'rs for similar reasons. In East Side, a state statute provided
11

12

13

that if two or more individuals applied to lease the same grazing land, a conflict auction
would be held and the lease would be offered to the highest bidder. 34 Idaho 807, 813-

14

14, 198 P. 760,761 (1921). However, the Land Board awarded the grazing lease to a

15

company without holding an auction.

16

The Attorney General relies on a general statement in East Side to the effect that

17

the Idaho Constitution and statutes require the Land Board to offer leases to the

18

highest bidder. As with IWP I, the statutorily created auction requirement distinguishes

19

that case from this case, which is only dealing with the constitutionality of I.C. § 5820

310A. The Court's analysis in East Side repeatedly refers to the statutory basis for the
21
22

23

auction requirement, making the constitutional references unnecessary to the holding in
that case.

24

In JWP III, the Idaho Supreme Court held that I.C. § 58-310B's express direction

25

to the Land Board to consider the interests of the State in general, in addition to the

26
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public lands beneficiaries, was in violation of Article IX, Section 8's directive to
2

maximize long term financial returns to the beneficiaries. Idaho Watersheds Project v.

3

State Bd. of Land Comm'rs ("fWP Iff''), 133 Idaho 64, 67, 982 P.2d 367, 370 (1999).

4

The Attorney General relies on IWP III for the proposition that the Land Board cannot

5

take action for the benefit of anyone other than the beneficiaries of the public lands.

6

Although that general proposition is true, it is important to note the significant

7

differences between I.C. § 58-310A and I.C. § 58-310B.

8

I.C. § 58-310B dealt specifically with grazing leases instead of cottage site

9

leases, and required grazing leases to be subject to conflict auctions, rather than
10

exempting them.

Furthermore, I.C. § 58-310B directed the Land Board to consider

11

12

certain criteria before awarding a grazing lease, including directing the Land Board to

13

make decisions that benefited the State in general. Jd.

14

does not contain any unconstitutional provision that requires the Land Board to

15

consider any criteria other than securing the maximum long term financial return for the

16

beneficiaries. It is important to note that IWP fII does not stand for the proposition that

17
18

Conversely, I.C. § 58-310A

allowing for leases of public lands without public auctions cannot possibly secure
maximum long term financial return. The key to the Courts holding in IWP III was that

19

H[b]y attempting to promote funding for the schools and the state through the leasing of
20

the school endowment lands, I.C. § 58-310B violates the requirements of Article IX, §
21
22

23

8." Id.

Finally, in IWP II, the Idaho Supreme Court invalidated a voter-approved ballot
because

it was

impermissibly combined

separate and

incongruous

24

measure

25

amendments, in violation of another provision in the Idaho Constitution. See Idaho

26
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Watersheds Project v. Marvel ("IWP 11'). 133 Idaho 55, 59,982 P.2d 358, 362 (1999).
2

One of the proposed amendments sought to change the word "disposal" to "sale" in

3

Article IX, Section 8.

4

measure was proposed evidences that people generally understood the word "disposal"

5

to include leases.

6
7

The Attorney General contends that the fact such a ballot

However, the Appendix to IWP /I only serves to demonstrate that the term
"disposal" is ambiguous, which is an issue that this Court has already addressed. The

8

Statements for the Proposed Amendments stated that "[c]hanging the word 'disposal' to
9

'sale' is necessary to clarify ambiguous terms." Id. at 63, 982 P.2d at 366.

The

10

Statements Against the Proposed Amendments stated that "[t]he word 'disposal' may
11

12

be ambiguous, but should remain open to different interpretations as time and
1

13

circumstances require: !d. at 64, 982 P.2d at 367.

14

In reviewing the relevant case law on the issue of whether I.C. § 58-310A is

15

constitutional, it is clear that the Idaho Supreme Court has never determined whether it

16

is possible for leases of public lands to secure maximum long term financial return for

17
18

the endowment lands' beneficiaries without subjecting the leases to a public auction
requirement.

There is nothing in I.C. § 58-310A that prevents the Land Board from

19

utilizing current fair market value and determining a rate of return that secures
20

maximum long term financial return for the designated beneficiaries.

As such, the

21
22

23

question that the Court returns to is whether it is possible to construe I.C. § 58-310A in
a manner that will render the statute constitutional on its face.

24
25

26

I The Statements Against the Proposed Amendments also state that "[aJlthough the word 'disposal' has
historically been interpreted to mean 'sale,' the definition of 'disposal' is still disputed."
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I.C. § 58-310A does not require impermissible considerations such as I.C. § 58310B required. Furthermore. it is possible that the Land Board could secure maximum
2

3

long term financial return for the endowment lands beneficiaries as mandated under

4

Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution without subjecting the cottage site leases

5

to a public auction based on the unique nature of the cottage sites. Based on these

6

considerations, the Attorney General has not demonstrated that I.C. § 58-310A is

7

unconstitutional in all of its applications or that no set of circumstances exists under

8
9

which I.C. § 58-310A would be valid.

Therefore. the Court will deny the Attorney

General's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality of I.C. § 58-310A

10

because I.C. § 58-310A is constitutional on its face.
11

CONCLUSION
12
13

The Court DENIES the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:

14

Contract Claims; GRANTS the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary

15

Judgment Re: Contract Claims; and DENIES the Attorney General's Motion for

16

Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality of I.C. § 58-310A.

17

DATED this

L

day of Ju ne 2011.

18

19

20
21

22
23

24
25
26
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